9.39 Myths about Unintended Consequences

One of the generic arguments against any proposed change is that there might be unintended or unexpected consequences.

The attractiveness of this generic argument is that opponents need not identify any specific consequence, and therefore no thoughtful discussion is possible.

Nonetheless, there are several responses to this generic argument:

1. Change can have unintended and unexpected desirable consequences just as easily as it can have undesirable consequences.
2. No significant unexpected undesirable consequences surfaced when an analogous action was taken in a closely related situation.
3. Reversing the proposed action would be relatively easy if there were significant unexpected undesirable consequences.
4. The consequence of inaction is that the known shortcomings of the existing system will not be corrected.

Concerning item (1), opponents do not specify what the consequences might be. Hence, we cannot ascertain whether these consequences are desirable or undesirable.

Concerning item (2), there certainly were no significant unexpected undesirable consequences when the states switched to direct popular election of their chief executives. In 1787, only Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont conducted popular elections for the office of Governor.[626] During the late 18^th and early 19^th centuries, the states switched, one-by-one, to direct popular election of Governors. Today, 100% of the states elect their Governors by direct popular vote. After over 5,000 direct popular elections for Governor in over two centuries, no state has ever decided to eliminate its direct popular election for Governor, and there is virtually no editorial, academic, legislative, or public criticism of direct election of Governors.

Concerning item (3), the National Popular Vote compact is state legislation. If some undesirable unexpected consequence materializes or some adjustment becomes advisable, an interstate compact may be repealed or amended more easily than a federal constitutional amendment.

Concerning item (4), the consequences of inaction are known and undesirable, and they include the following:

• Four out of five states and four out of five voters are ignored in Presidential Elections. One of the consequences of the current winner-take-all rule (i.e., awarding all of a state’s electoral votes to the presidential candidate who receives the most popular votes in each separate state) is that presidential candidates do not expend significant time, effort, or money in states in which they are comfortably ahead or hopelessly behind. Presidential candidates ignore such states because they do not receive additional or fewer electoral votes based on the size of the margin by which they win or lose a state (as discussed in section 1.2.1).
• The Current System Does Not Reliably Reflect the Nationwide Popular Vote. The state-by-state winner-take-all rule makes it possible for a candidate to win the Presidency without winning the most popular votes nationwide. This has occurred in four of the nation’s 57 presidential elections between 1789 and 2012—1 in 14 (as detailed in section 1.2.2). In the past six decades, there have been six presidential elections in which a shift of a relatively small number of votes in one or two states would have elected (and, of course, in 2000, did elect) a presidential candidate who lost the popular vote nationwide (as discussed in section 1.2.2).
• Not Every Vote Is Equal. The state-by-state winner-take-all rule creates variations of 1000-to-1 and more in the weight of a vote (as detailed in section 1.2.3).

Footnotes